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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
]

THE STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellee,
',

vs.

ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE,
$3,000.00 CASH,
NO. 890245
Defendant and Appellant. )
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide the appeal
pursuant to § 78-2(3)(j)/ Utah Code Annotated/ 1953/ as amended
1987.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal of the
plaintiff f s Complaint for Forfeiture and the defendant's Reply
and Coun t e r c 1 a I ins t: t\ e r e t o e n t er ed lby 1: h e H<:::>no r a b 1 e D e a n C o n d e r
sitting for the Honorable J* Phillip Eves in the Fifth District
Court/ Washington County.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Did the Court err in dismissing plaintiff's

Complaint for Forfeiture and the Answer thereto filed by the
owner of the property together with the Counterclaims?
II.

Were the counterclaims of Andrew Lewis Taylor

properly brought in the forfeiture action?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ STATUTES AND RULES
Constitution of State of Utah/ Art. 1/ § 11
All courts shall be open

r

an(3 every person / £or an In jury done to

him in his person/ property or reputation/ shall have remedy by

due course of law/ which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State/ by himself or
counsel/ any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 8(c)
Affirmative defenses.

In pleading to a preceding pleading/ a

party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction/
arbitration and award/ assumption of risk/ contributory negligence/ discharge in bankruptcy/ duress estopped failure of
consideration/ fraud/ illegality/ injury by fellow servant/
laches/ license/ payment release/ res judicata/ statute of
frauds/ statute of linmitations/ waiver/ and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.

When a party

has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a
counterclaim as a defense/ the court on terms/ if justice so
requires/ shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper
designation.
Rule 8(f)
Construction of Pleadings.

All Pleadings shall be so construed

as to do substantial justice.
Rule 12(b)
See Addendum 10
Rule 12(h)
See Addendum 11
Rule 13(a)
See Addendum 12
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Rule 15(a)
See Addendum 13
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case/ Course of Proceedings and Disposition
The claimant of the property/ counterclaimant and

appellant Andrew Lewis Taylor was stopped on the Freeway in
Washington County by Utah Highway Patrolmen.

His vehicle was

subsequently impounded when the officers discovered contraband
and arrested the defendant.

His vehicle and cash were taken from

him and a Complaint for the forfeiture of the vehicle was filed
by the State of Utah on September 3/ 1987.

An Answer and

Counterclaim was filed to the Complaint for Forfeiture on October
10/ 1987.
Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their Petition for
Forfeiture on April 25/ 1988.
hearing until May 9f
date.

That motion was not noticed for

1988/ and was never renoticed after that

On January 11/ 1989/ D. Michael Carter/ Deputy Attorney

General filed an Appearance of Counsel also on behalf of
plaintiff.

On February 14, 1989/ counsel for the State filed a

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and requested oral argument/
which motion was pursuant to a scheduling conference set for
April 20/ 1989.

At the scheduling conference on April 20/ Judge

Conder appeared sitting for Judge Eves and entered an order
granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss which was not set for
hearing on that day and dismissed defendant and appellant's
answer and all counterclaims.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 28/ 1987/ a 1983 Oldsmobile Royale and
$3/000.00 in cash were taken from Andrew Lewis Taylor by
troopers/ employees of the Utah Highway Patrol/ State of Utah.
Subsequently/ on September 3/ 1987/ a Complaint for Forfeiture of
Property was filed by the Deputy Washington County Attorney
requesting pursuant to section 58-37-13/ Utah Code Annotated
1958/ that the property be forfeited to the State of Utah.

The

Complaint for Forfeiture was personally served together with a
Summons/ copies of each of which are attached hereto/ marked
Addendum 1 and incorporated herein by reference/ on Andrew Lewis
Taylor on or about September 15/ 1987.

Said Andrew Lewis Taylor/

through counsel answered the Complaint for Forfeiture as required
by the Summons and filed certain counterclaims/ a copy of said
answer and counterclaim are attached hereto marked Addendum 2 and
incorporated herein by reference.

The plaintiff's Answer (Reply)

to Andrew Lewis Taylor's Counterclaim was filed on November 3/
1987/ a copy of which is attached hereto marked Addendum 3 and
incorporated herein by reference.

On April 25/ 1988/ plaintiff

filed a Motion to Dismiss/ a copy of which is attached hereto
marked Addendum 4 and incorporated herein by reference.

On May

26/ 1988/ the property owner Andrew Lewis Taylor filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment/ a copy of which is attached hereto marked
Addendum 5 and incorporated herein by reference.

The Motion to

Dismiss and Andrew Lewis Taylorfs Motion For Summary Judgment
were brought before the Honorable Phillip Eves in Chambers on
June 6/ 1988/ however/ no legal ruling was made thereon/ the
Court requesting that counsel include as attorneys for plaintiff
-4-

someone from the Office of the Attorney General/ State of Utah.
On January 11/ 1989/ D. Michael Carter/ Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Utah entered an appearance on
behalf of plaintiff.

On February 14/ 1989/ a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment/ Request for Oral Argument and Notice of Hearing
was filed by D. Michael Carter on behalf of plaintiff/ a copy of
which is attached hereto marked Addendum 6 and incorporated
herein by reference.

A telephonic scheduling conference was held

on December 22/ 1988/ and a Scheduling Order/ a copy of which is
attached hereto marked Addendum 7 and incorporated herein by
reference/ was issued thereafter.

On March 14/ 1989/ a Notice of

Hearing was filed by the Deputy Washington County Attorney
scheduling plaintifffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment/
Request for Oral Argument for April 20/ 1989/ a copy of which is
attached hereto marked Addendum 8 and incorporated herein by
reference.

In the Scheduling Order/ a pretrial was scheduled for

April 20/ and trial for May 9,

1989.

At the pretrial on the 20th day of April/ the only
legal matter noticed for argument and stipulated to by counsel
was the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the
parties appeared on April 20/ before Judge Conder/ sitting for
Judge Eves.

Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and defendant and

owner of the property's Motion for Summary Judgment were not
noticed for hearing and were not before the Court on April 20/
1989.

At said hearing/ the court apparently concluded that

Andrew Lewis Taylor was not a party to the action (see colloquy
between Court and counsel/ Transcript/ pages 2, 3/ and 4/ copies
-5-

attached hereto marked Addendum 9 and incorporated herein by
reference).

In the discussion surrounding plaintiff's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment/ the Court apparently concluded an
interpleader should be filed by Andrew Lewis Taylor and then the
Court moved from its discussion of the interpleader/ and opened
the question of the Motion to Dismiss/ which was not before the
Court (Transcript/ pages 9, 10/ and 11). Counsel for Mr. Taylor
then asked the Court to allow him two days within which to file
an interpleader (Transcript/ page 12)/ and again requested the
interpleader in the face of what appeared to be an imminent
adverse ruling (Transcript/ page 15)/ and the Court did not rule
on counsel's request to interplead except by implication in his
refusal to grant the interpleader evidenced by the Order of
Dismissal.

The court indicated that it could not rule on

plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Transcript/ page
18)/ and subsequently reiterated that the mistake in filing of
the forfeiture action by plaintiff did not justify summary
judgment (Transcript/ page 19). However/ in dismissing the
action including the counterclaims/ the Court/ in effect/ granted
a summary judgment/ although the Court throughout the transcript
in discussion took pains to point out it was not making any
decisions or issuing any rulings on the legal issues raised by
plaintiff's motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The counterclaimant Andrew Lewis Taylor urges that

the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint over his objection and the
dismissal of his counterclaims filed in response to the petition
-6-

of forfeiture were error.

Andrew Lewis Taylor submits that the

Court could not pursuant to the applicable Rules of Procedure in
this State fail either to allow him to amend his pleadings (Rule
15a) to "interplead" if the Court thought that was necessary/ or
to leave the counterclaims pending for determination as required
by the Rules 41(2) if the petition of plaintiff was dismissed.
In dismissing plaintiff's petition and defendant's counterclaims/
the defendant has been denied his opportunity to litigate these
claims and denied his right to access to the courts under the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
2.

The counterclaimant/appellant Andrew Lewis Taylor

was served with a summons and complaint for forfeiture of his
property.

He answered the summons and complaint pursuant to the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and asserted four counterclaims.
Although the complaint for forfeiture did not ask for the
forfeiture of cash seized by the State of Utah agents/ the
counterclaims of the counterclaimant Andrew Lewis Taylor
requested not only the return of his automobile but also the
return of his money/ or in the alternative/ the value of each
together with the value of the loss of use of each.

The District

Court did not reach the issue of whether the counterclaimant/
appellant had "standing" nor did it reach the issue as to the
legitimacy and propriety of the counterclaims.

Under the

circumstances/ the counmterclaimant believes and urges that the
counterclaims were properly brought pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and that they could not be dismissed without a
legal determination thereon.
-7-

ARGUMENT
"POINT I
The Court improperly dismissed plaintifffs complaint
over the objection of the owner Andrew Lewis Taylor.

Rule 41(2)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissal of actions
by order of the court as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule# an action shall not be dismissed
at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the Court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss/ the action shall not be
dismissed aginst the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in
the order a dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice.
It is clear that in not ruling on the counterclaims and
failing to retain those claims pending for independent adjudication by the Court/ the dismissal was improper.

Further/ while

implicit in the argument of the plaintiff and observations
thereto by the Court that "standing" was questioned/ the failure
to allow the responding party/ Andrew Lewsis Taylor/ an opportunity to remedy those procedural deficiencies perceived by the
Court in a reasonable period of time was an abuse of discretion/
and/ in so doing/ the Court violated Rule 8(f)/ "all pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice"/ of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which latter rule states in relevant
part:
a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of Court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires.
-8-

The question of "standing" should not be considered by
this Court for two reasons.

First/ neither Andrew Lewis Taylor's

claims/ nor the motion of plaintiff/ wherein "standing" is first
mentioned were expressly ruled on in the District Court.

While

the Court indicated it was not passing on any of the legal
matters and not granting any summary judgment/ it nevertheless in
its dismissal invalidated/ cancelled/ or otherwise precluded the
counterclaims of Andrew Lewis Taylor from being asserted.

And in

so doing/ the Court has/ in effect/ granted a summary judgment on
a basis which is not clear from its ruling/ but did so contrary
to its espoused purposes to guaranteed fairness to both sides.
The Court if in fact it ruled on the "standing"
question abused its discretion in failing to allow the amendment
of the pleadings to correct the "standing" issue by the filing of
an interpleader/ which the Court appeared to have found necessary
in this action/ Andrew Lewis Taylor asserts/ however/ that an
interpleader action is not necessary and that in fact he was
properly before the Court.
Second/ the District Court made two errors in
considering the motion to dismiss.

Initially it turned to and

considered a motion not before it and then it acted granting a
motion seemingly on the basis of "standing"/ which motion was not
timely.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires

a party to set forth affirmatively its defenses "and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."

Rule

12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates the mandate of
Rule 8 in connection with counterclaims and establishes two
-9-

options for presenting defenses by motion but requires
A motion making any of [such] defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted
and Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure imposes on a
party a waiver of
all defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or/ if he has
made no motion/ in his answer or reply . . . .
If the district Court in granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss
relied on one of the exceptions to the above quoted language in
Rule 12(h), then the basis for its ruling should have been
specifically identified.
On November 3/ 1987/ in a pleading which was a Reply
but designated as an Answer to Andrew Lewis Taylor's Counterclaims/ no defense or suggestion was made that the said Andrew
Lewis Taylor lacked "standing" to assert such claims (see
Addendum 3).

The motion to dismiss which the Court considered

was submitted on the 25th of April/ 1988/ was not timely made in
accordance with Rules 8 and 12/ and likewise did not raise a
"standing" issue.

Rather/ the untimely filed motion seemed to

address the jurisdiction of the Court to consider counterclaims
in a forfeiture action and alleged as a defense the State's being
absolved from liability for the reason that it divested itself of
the subject property.

Again/ neither postulate was raised timely

as an "avoidance or affirmative defense".
Consequently/ while Point 1 of the State's memorandum
for sumamry disposition addressed "standing"/ that matter was not
determined by the ruling of the District Court and if it was/ it
-10-

was considered and determined erroneously.

The owner and

counterclaimant Andrew Lewis Taylor should have been afforded an
opportunity to correct any deficiencies in his pleadings.
ARGUMENT
POINT II
The statutory nature of a forfeiture proceeding does
not exlcude the subject of forfeiture from asserting legitimate
counterclaims.

The plaintiff sued to forefeit the property of

Andrew Lewis Taylor/ served Andrew Lewis Taylor with a summons
and complaint/ and demanded that he answer.

These actions were

taken pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the State of Utah.
Rules 12 and 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandated
that all defenses and objections be represented in that lawsuit
and that all counterclaims be brought as "compulsory" counterclaims if
it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the Court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ Rule 13(a).
The Court in granting the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss
and including therein the claims and defenses of Andrew Lewis
Taylor deprived the said Andrew Lewis Taylor of the benefit of a
hearing on his compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13.
The defendant Andrew Lewis Taylor asserts that he is
entitled to maintain both the counterclaims and to contest the
forfeiture action by his answer.
both grounds.

The Court denied him relief on

In so doing without ruling on the legal issues
-11-

raised in plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment/ and in
considering plaintiff's motion to Dismiss/ which was not before
the Court/ the Court has/ by implication/ ruled that the Rules of
Procedure do not apply to the statutory forfeiture action and
such ruling is clearly erroneous.
The matter was on for a Pretrial Conference/ the legal
issues being limited to the Partial Summary Judgment Motion of
plaintiff by stipulation and the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss
was not before the Court.

In denying the claimant and owner

Andrew Lewis Taylor of his right to trial/ or alternatively in
not making a clear legal ruling on any of the questions raised by
the motion under consideration and by going beyond what was
before the Court/ the said Andrwew Lewis Taylor was denied his
right to trial in violation of Article 1/ Section 11 of the
Constitution of Utah.
CONCLUSION
If/ in fact/ the determination of the Court below was
that Andrew Lewis Taylor had no standing to assert the claims he
made by virtue of filing an interpleader/ the Court abused its
discretion in not allowing him to assert his claims by such
interpleader so that the legal issues raised could be considered
and ruled on appropriately with those parties ruled adversely
against having the right to present the issues to this Court.
The muddled ruling of the lower Court denied the claimant and
owner of the vehicle his opportunity to have the matters raised
by his responsive pleading/ which responsive pleading was
demanded by the Summons and Complaint served on him/ heard and
-12-

determined by the Court.

The Court in short-circuiting the

process and failing to properly preserve the counterclaims for
subsequent dertermination either as a summary judgment matter or
for trial committed reversible error.
There was no authority for the District Court to
consider the 1988 Motion to Dismiss/ the same not being noticed
for hearing.

Even if it had been noticed/ the motion did not

properly and timely raise an issue which it could be said the
Court found dispositive.

In considering the motion to dismiss

and granting the same without preserving the counterclaims for a
subsequent determination of all the legal and procedural issues
raised by such counterclaims/ the Court failed to provide the
protection of Article 1/ Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah
to Andrew Lewis Taylor and denied him his right to a "remedy by
due course of law which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay".
WHEREFORE Andrew Lewis Taylor prays the matter be
summarily reversed by this Court and returned for adjudication on
the law and merits as justice so requires.
Dated this

day of October/ 1989.

J. Franklin Allred
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant

-13-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have mailed/ postage prepaid/
two copies each of Brief of the Appellant/ to:
D. Michael Carter
Assistant Attorney General
Chief/ Governmental Affairs Division
Southern Utah State College
Administration Building/ 3rd Floor
Cedar City/ Utah 84720
0. Brenton Rowe
Deputy Washington County Attorney
220 North 200 East
St. George/ Utah 84770
Dated this

day of October/ 1989.
J. Franklin Allred
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant

Paul F. Graf #1229
Washington County Attorney
0. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Hall of J u s t i c e
220 North 200 East
St* George/ Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH/

Plaintiff/

SUMMONS

-vsONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE/
$3/300,00 CASH/
Defendant.

C i v i l No,

87-1585

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANDREW LEWIS TAYLOR AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES:
You are hereby suimoned and required to file an Answer in writing to
the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court/ and to serve
upon/ or mail to 0. Brenton Rowe/ Deputy Washington County Attorney/ 220 North
200 East/ St. George/ Utah 84770/ a copy of said Answer/ within twenty (20)
days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to do so/ Judgment by default will be taken against you
for the relief demand in said Complaint/ which has been filed with the Clerk of
said Court and a copy of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this

of September/ 1987.

5. BRENTON RCWE
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY

ADDENDUM 1

Paul P. Graf #1229
Washington County Attorney
0. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Hall of J u s t i c e
220 North 200 East
S t . George/ Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON/ STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH/

Plaintiff/

NOTICE OF SEIZURE AND
INTENT TO FORFEIT

-vsONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE/
$3/300.00 CASH,
Defendant.

Civil No. 87-1585

TO: ANDREW LEWIS TAYLOR

Pursuant to UCA 58-37-13/ notice i s hereby given to you t h a t one 1983
Oldsmobile Royale and $3/300.00 Cash has been seized by the Utah Highway
Patrol/ in Washington County/ State of Utah/ on the 28th day of January/ 1987/
and t h a t the State of Utah intends to commence proceedings to have a l l of your
r i g h t / t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in said property f o r f e i t e d to the Department of
Finance.

7/Jday of

DATED t h i s 3

September/ 1987.

/^(tnO^J^Z
0. BRENTON ROWE

AzJ^

DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY

R E T U R N

STATE OP UTAH

OP

S E R V I C E

)
)ss.

COUNTY OP WASHINGTON

)

I# the undersigned/ hereby c e r t i f y and return that
I r e c e i v e d the attached document on the
/19

mmmmmmmmmmm

day of

9 and served the same upon

AndfclQ'/jZlil^ldJA/nr

p e r s o n a l l y / by d e l i v e r i n g to and

l e a v i n g with above named person in the City of St* George/
County of Washington/ State of Utah/ a true copy of the attached
document/ on the _____ day of

, 19

/ at

^^^^^^^^^ a.nu/p»ro«
I further c e r t i f y t h a t on the copy of the attached
document so served/ I endorsed the date and place of s e r v i c e / and
added my name and o f f i c i a l
DATED t h i s

title
day of

thereof.
/ 19

•

RFTH JUWC1AL DST COURT
WA3WN8T0N C«JNTY

Paul F. Graf #1229
Washington County Attorney
0. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Hall of Justice
220 North 200 East
St. George, UT 84770
(801) 634-5723

'//•:,',,*,.

..*..

—

CLERK

— DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE
OF PROPERTY

Plaintiff
-vsONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE,
$3,300.00 CASH,
Defendant

Civil No.

^ ^ -/5~£ ^f

COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through its attorney, 0.
Brenton Rowe, Deputy Washington County Attorney, and alleges as
follows:
1.

That the acts alleged herein occurred in Washington

County, State of Utah.
2.

That this action is being brought pursuant to Section

58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
3.

That the property which is the subject of this action is

a 1983 Oldsmobile Royale, California license no. 2ABT952, Vin no.
1G3AY69Y)DX335037.
4.

That the vehicle is owned by Andrew Lewis Taylor, 740

Ridgehaven, LaHabra, California, 90631.
5.

That on or about the 28th day of January, 1987, Andrew

Lewis Taylor

ped at a. routine roadblock south of St.

George at approximately 1100 hours.

Trooper Brent Dunlap asked

Mr. Taylor for his drivers license and registration.

At this

time it was noted that the vehicle was registered in another name
other than the person driving it.

Mr. Taylor then produced a

bill of sale and title for proof.

The bill of sale was not

notarized and did not appear to be an official document.

The

title had been signed off by the registered owner in June of
1986, but the new owner information had not been filled in.
Trooper Jim Lloyd asked Mr. Taylor if he could search his
vehicle.

Mr. Taylor agreed and Trooper Lloyd went to get a

search warrant.

When he returned with the Search Warrant, Mr.

Taylor stated he changed his mind and refused to sign the form.
The vehicle was subsequently impounded on improper registrations
without proof of ownership.

The vehicle was inventoried and

$3,300 cash was found in the vehicle.

Also found were two purple

and white sacks containing plastic bags with a white powder in
them, which was tested and identified as cocaine.

One plastic

bag contained 153.1 grams and the other 138.9 grams.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays that the above-entitled Court
enter Judgment against Andrew Lewis Taylor pursuant to Section
58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated, as follows:
That all right, title and interest in the 1983 Olds Royale,
California license no. 2ABT952, Vin no. 1G3AY69Y)DX335037 and
$3,300,00 cash, be forfeited and that the vehicle be delivered to
the custody of the department of finance for disposal as provided
in Section 58-37

-13(8), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended,
DATED this J

da

Y

of

September, 1987•

0. BRENTON ROWE
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

0, BRENTON ROWE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says
that he has read the foregoing complaint, knows the contents
thereof, and that the same are true except as to those matters
which are based upon information and belief and as to those
matters he believes them to be true.

^£L_
0. BRENTON ROWE
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1987.

^

day of September,

>^^S

My Commission Expires:

//-M-&?

NOTARY /PUBLIC
V
Residing in Washington County

J. Franklin Allred/ P.C./ #A0058
Attorney for Owner and Counterclaimant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City/ Ut 84102
Telephone: (801)531-1990

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH/

)

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff/
vs.
ONE 1983 OLDSMOB1LE
ROYALE/ $3/300.00 CASH/
Defendant.

]
)

Civil No. 87-1585

]

Andrew Lewis Taylor by and through his attorney J.
Franklin Allred herewith answers the complaint for forfeiture of
property in the above-entitled case/ the said Andrew Lewis Taylor
being the rightful owner of all such property as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Owner answers the specific allegations of the
complaint/ admitting/ alleging and denying as follows:

The owner

admits paragraphs 1/ 2, 3 and 4 of said complaint/ and admits so
much of paragraph 5 that alleges on the 28th of January he was
stopped in a roadblock, that he was asked for his license and
registration/ that he produced a bill of sale and title, which
bill of sale were valid and legitimate, admits that the title had

been signed off by the registered owner/ admits that the officers
requested to search his vehicle/ but denies he ultimately
consented to such a search; he admits that, he refused to sign a
consent to search and that the vehicle was subsequently
impounded/ but denies the suggestion that the stop/ questioning/
examination of his documents/ impound and inventory were lawful/
they being in actuality an unlawful search and seizure.

The

owner admits that $3/300 cash owned by him and possessed legally
was in the vehicle and that the vehicle was owned by him and
legally possessed/ and denies the last sentence of paragraph 5 on
the basis that he has no knowledge as to the analyses of the
substances claimed to have been found.
THIRD DEFENSE
The stop of the owner was unlawful.
FOURTH DEFENSE
That the detention of the owner of the property was
unlawful.
FIFTH DEFENSE
That the seizure of the vehicle and money were the
fruit of an unlawful search of Mr. Taylor's personal property.
SIXTH DEFENSE
The impoundment and inventory of the automobile were
unlawful.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
That a previous finding of a district court in this
State found that the stop/ detention/ search/ and seizure of the
owner's automobile and money were unlawful/ which decision was

not appealed/ and it is conclusive as to the illegality of said
search and dispositive of the right to forfeit the subject
property*
WHEREFORE the owner prays that the complaint be
dismissed no cause of action and that he be awarded his judgment
in accordance with his counterclaims hereinafter made.
COUNTERCLAIM
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That Andrew Lewis Taylor is the counterclaimant

herein and as such is the owner of the 1983 Oldsmobile Royale and
$3/300.00 in cash/ which is the subject-matter of this lawsuit.
2.

That on or about the 28th day of January 1987/ said

Andrew Lewis Taylor was unlawfully stopped and his vehicle and
personal belongings were unlawfully searched/ and his vehicle/
property/ and cash unlawfully seized by the State of Utah and its
agents and employees/ James D. Lloyd/ Phillip Barney and others
whose names are not now known to counterclaimant.
3.

That a previous decision of the above-entitled

Court ruled conclusively in the favor of the counterclaimant and
said decision has not been set aside or reversed on appeal/ and
is not now being appealed/ the time for appeal having expired.
4.

The owner and counterclaimant is entitled to the

immediate return of his vehicle and $3/300.00 in cash.
5.

That the owner of said vehicle and cash is entitled

to recover as damages from the plaintiff the reasonable value of
the use of said vehicle during the entire period for which he has
been deprived of the same/ together with the reasonable value of
-3-

the interest on all cash seized until such time as all property
is returned to hinu
6.

The owner and counterclaimant is entitled to

recover his costs and attorney's fees herein.
SECOND CAUSE OP ACTION
1.

The owner and counterclaimant incorporates

paragraphs 1 through 6 of his first cause of action in this his
second cause of action.
2.

That the State of Utah has converted and

missappropriated the vehicle and cash of the counterclaimant.
3.

That the State of Utah has violated the authortiy

of the statute under which it sues and § 77-23-8 Utah Code
Annotated by failing to hold and maintain said property subject
to the order of this Court.
4.

That each of the acts of the State in obtaining and

disposing of counterclaimant's property was done willfully/
maliciously and with an intent to damage the owner and
counterclaimant/
5.

That the owner and counterclaimant has been damaged

by the loss of use of his property and the loss of the value of
the automobile and the interest value of the money/ and has been
generally damaged thereby.
6.

That because of the acts of the State of Utah were

willful/ deliberate and done with an intent to deprive the owner
and counterclaimant of his property without due process of law
and absent statutory authorization/ the owner and counterclaimant
is entitled to recover punitive damages.
-4-

Or/ in the alternativa.-

if trial of said issues indicates that the acts of the plaintiff
State of Utah were only negligent/ then he is entitled to general
damages.
7.

The owner and counterclaimant is entitled to

recover his costs and attorney's fees in connection with this his
second counterclaim.
THIRD CAUSE OP ACTION
1.

The owner and counterclaimant incorporates

paragraphs 1 through 6 of of his first cause of action in this
his third cause of action.
2.

That the plaintiff above-named came into possession

of a 1983 Oldsmobile Royale and $3/300.00 in cash owned by Andrew
Lewis Taylor/ and as such became the trustee of a constructive
trust for the benefit of said Andrew Lewis Taylor.
3.

That the plaintiff above-named violated its

responsibility as trustee of the constructive trust for the
safekeeping of the subject property and released said property to
third persons in violation of the said Andrew Lewis Taylor's
interest in said property and in violation of the plaintiff's
obligation as trustee of said constructive trust.
4.

No authority to release any of said property was

ever given to plaintiff by the owner of said property/ nor by a
court of this State.
5.

That the acts of the State and its agents and

employees were done willfully/ deliberately/ and for the purpose
of damaging the counterclaimant and depriving him of property
rightfully his.
-5-

6.

That the owner of said property is entitled to

order of this Court requirng the redelivery of the owner's
property/ or,

in the alternative/ payment of damages for the

property itself/ for the loss of use and the value thereof/ and
for attorney's fees and cost in connection with this matter.
7.

That counterclaimant is entitled to recover

punitive damages.
FOURTH CAUSE OP ACTION
1.

The owner and counterclaimant incorporates

paragraphs 1 through 6 of of his first cause of action in this
his fourth cause of action.
2.

That the State of Utah and its agents and employee

James D. Lloyd and Phillip Barney acted to violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of the owner of said property.
3.

That such action was in violation of Utah Code

Annotated § 78-16-1 et seq.
4.

That the actions of the individual employees of the

State of Utah and the State of Utah were grossly negligent/ or in
the alternative/ substantial/ willful/ or malicious.
5.

That the counterclaimant has been damaged by the

loss of his property/ the loss of the use of his property/ the
loss of the value of his money/ and generally by the substantial/
grossly negligent/ willful/ or malicious acts of the State and
its employees.
6.

That counterclaimant has been damaged by being

forced to expend attorney's fees to defend himself in State v.
Taylor.
-6-

7.

That as a result of said acts/ the owner and

counterclaimant is entitled to recover from the State and its
individual employees the value of the vehicle and the cash
together with the value for the loss of use thereof/ together
with his attorney's fees expended in connection with defending
the case entitled State v. Taylor/ and for his cost of attorney's
fees in bringing this action.
WHEREFORE the owner and counterclaimant prays on his
first cause of action for the return of his vehicle/ the return
of his $3/300.00/ for damages equivalent to the value of the
vehicle for the term of deprivation/ together with damages for
the money for the term of deprivation/ together with attorney's
fees and costs/ and general damages all of which in sum aggregate
$50,000.00.
On his second cause of action for the return of his
vehicle/ the return of his money/ damages for the loss of use of
his vehicle/ for attorney's fees/ costs/ and general damages in
the aggregate of $50/000.00/ and for punitive damages in the
amount of $50/000.00.
On his third cause of action for the return of his
vehicle/ the return of his money/ damages for the loss of use of
his vehicle and money/ for attorney's fees/ costs/ and general
damages in the aggregate of $50/000.00/ and for punitive damages
in the amount of $50/000.00.
On his fourth cause of action nominal damage in the
amount of $100.00/ plus costs and attorney's fees in the sum of
$25/000.00/ or such additional fee or fees as is deemed

reasonable by the Court together with punitive or exemplary
damages in the sum of $25/000.00.
Dated this k

day of October/ 1987.

J* Franklin Allred
Attorney for Counterclairaant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Answer and Counterclaim was mailed/ postage prepaid/

O. Brenton Rowe
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Washington County Hall of Justice
220 North 200 East
St. George/ UT 84770
David L. Wilkinson
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City/ UT 84114
Dated this

day of October/ 1987.

J. Franklin Allred ""
Attorney for Counterclaimant

PAUL F. GRAF #1229
Washington County Attorney
0. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Hall of Justice
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801)634-5723

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNT* OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff

)

ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROTALE,
$3,300.00 CASH/
Defendant*

]|

ANSWER TO ANDREW LEWIS TAYLOR'S
COUNTERCLAIM

Civil No. 87-1585

COMES NOW State of Utah by and through its attorney/ 0. Brenton Rowe/
and answers the Counterclaim of Andrew Lewis Taylor as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The Counterclaim fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
The property Andrew Lewis Taylor seeks to recover from the State of
Utah is in the possession of the State of Utah having been surrendered to the
United States Government/ Drug Enforcement Administration/ which has forfeited
said property as evidenced by Declarations of Forfeiture attached hereto and
marked "Exhibit 1*.
ANSWER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. Plaintiff lacks sufficient information to answer paragraph 1 of
the First Cause of Action and therefore denies all allegations therein.

2.

Plaintiff denies the allogations in paragraph 2, that the stop/

search and seizure was unlawful and admits the remaining allogations of
paragraph 2 in P l a i n t i f f ' s First Cause of Action.
3.

Plaintiff admits the allogations contained in paragraph 3 of

Andrew Lewis Taylor's First Cause of Action.
4. j

Plaintiff denies the allogations contained in paragraph 4, 5, and

6 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's First Cause of Action.
ANSWER TO SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff denies the allogations in paragraphs 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ and
7/ of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Second Cause of Action.
ANSWER TO THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff denies the allogations contained in paragraphs 1/ 2, 3/ 4/
5 / 6 / and 7 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Third Cause of Action.
ANSWER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

P l a i n t i f f denies the allogations contained in paragraphs 1/ 2, 3/

4/ 6/ and 7 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Fourth Cause of Action.
2.

P l a i n t i f f lacks s u f f i c i e n t information to admit or deny the

allogations contained in paragraph 5 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Fourth Cause of
Actions/ and therefore denies the allogations contained therein.
WHEREFORE/ p l a i n t i f f prays the above-entitled Court to dismiss the
counterclaim of Andrew Lewis Taylor for failure to raise a claim for which
r e l i e f may be granted.
DATED t h i s T

/j
day of November/ 1987.

0. BRENTON RGWE
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this ^/^

day of November/ 1987/ I mailed

a copy of the above and foregoing Answer to Andrew Lewis Taylor's Counterclaim
to J, Franklin Allred, Attorney for Owner and Counterclaimant/ 321 South 600
East/ Salt Lake City/ Utah 84102/ and David L. Wilkinson/ Utah Attorney
General/ 236 State Capitol Building/ Salt Lake City/ Utah 84114.
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DECLARATION

OF FORFEITURE

The above-described property has been seized by agents of the Drug
Enforcement Administration pursuant to 21 USC 881. Notice of the
seizure has been sent to all known parties who may have a legal or
possessory interest in the property.

Also, in accordance with 19 USC

I607t notice of the seizure has been published and no claim has been
filed for the property within 20 days from the date of the first
publication of the advertisement*

THEREFORE, it is hereby declared

that such property is forfeited to the United States pursuant to
19 USC 1609.

A-rtetForreitu^e^n\t
Office of .Chief Counsel

cc

USMS/HQS -

DEA-294 (5/87)
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Paul F. Graf #1229
Washington County Attorney
0. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Hall of Justice
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]1

MOTION TO DISMISS

]

ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE
ROYALE, $3,300.00 CASH,

;)

Civil No. 87-1585

Defendant.
COMES NOW the State of Utah/ by and through 0. Brenton
Rowe/ Deputy Washington County Attorney/ and moves the aboveentitled Court to dismiss the proceedings/ in the above-entitled
matter.

This motion is based on the grounds and reasons that the

United States Government Drug Enforcement Administration has seized
the property subject to this action (see attached Declaration of
Forfeiture) and the State of Utah is no longer in possession of
said property/ and has no interest in forfeiture of said property.
THE PLAINTIFF FURTHER MOVES to dismiss the Defendant's
counterclaim on the grounds that 58-37-13/ Utah Code Annotated
1953/ as Amended/ does not provide for filing of counterclaims to
be filed concerning civil rights violation contained in Defendants
ADDENDUM 4

counterclaim which would be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y f i l e d as S e c t i o n
1983 C i v i l R i g h t ' s a c t i o n in the United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court.
DATE D this /$

d
day of April/ 1988.
f
O.

BRENTON ROME

s*-r~n

DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this ^ ^ ^ d a y of April/ 1988/
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing MOTION
TO DISMISS to J. Franklin Allred, 321 South 600 East/ Salt Lake
City/ Utah 84102.
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DECLARATION OF FORFEITURE
The above-described property has been seized by agents of the Drug
Enforcement Administration pursuant to 21 USC 881. Notice of the
seizure has been sent to all known parties who may have a legal or
possessory interest in the property. Also, in accordance with 19 USC
1607, notice of the seizure has been published and no claim has been
filed for the property within 20 days from the date of the first
publication of the advertisement. THEREFORE, it is hereby declared
that such property is forfeited to"the United States pursuant to
19 USC 1609.

Office of Chief Counsel

cc:

USMS/HQS - NASAFP

DEA-294 (5/87)

J)

>
BY

$T

J. Franklin Allred/ P.C./ #A0058
Attorney for Owner and Counterclaimant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-1990
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
1

Plaintiff/

11

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE
ROYALE/ $3/300.00 CASH/

Civil No. 87-1585
]

Defendant.

Judge Eves

The owner of the subject property in the above-entitled
matter/ Andrew Lewis Taylor/ by and through his attorney J.
Franklin Allred/ hereby moves the Court for an order granting
summary judgment in the above-entitled case with respect to the
return of the subject property/ or its value at the time of
taking^ and for an order setting the general and consequential
damages for trial on the grounds and for the reasons as follows:
1.

The pleadings on file indicate that there is no

genuine issue of material fact left to be decided with respect to
the issue of liability for the return of the vehicle for the
reasons that:
a)

The Court has ruled that the search of the vehicle

was improper and unlawful.

A copy of the Court's ruling is

attached hereto/ marked Exhibit A and incorporated herewith.
b)

The pleadings admit that the property was not

ADDENDUM 5

proceeded against by the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 58-37-13.
c)

The pleadings admit that the property was converted

by the State of Utah by delivery or release thereof to agents of
the United States Government in violation of the mandate of Utah
State statutes.
2.

No genuine issue of material fact exists with

regard to the first three causes of action as set out in the
property-owner's counterclaims for the reason that the search and
seizure and the disposition or release of said property is
against law in that UCA 58-37-13 strictly mandates the seizure of
vehicles and their disposition requiring/ among other things/
that:
a)

UCA 58-37-13(4) requires that property taken or

detained under this section is not repleviable but is "in custody
of the law enforcement agency making the seizure/ subject only to
the orders and decrees of the court or the official having
jurisdiction."
b)

The Act further provides under section (4) thereof

seised property may be dealt with in one of three following ways;
that is/ placing the property under seal/ removing the property
to a place designated by it or the warrant under which it was
seized/ or to take custody of the property and remove it to an
appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
3.

That the acts of the State of Utah herein were not

timely done in accordance with the mandate of the applicable
State law and therefore cannot be sustained at trial.
-2-

WHEREFORE/ the said Andrew Lewis Taylor prays that his
property be returned to him and that the matter be set for trial
on the appropriate measure of damages on all^causes of action.
Dated this H- b

day of May/ 1^88.

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE DEFENDANT AND ITS ATTORNEY 0. BRENTON ROWE:
You will please take notice that defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment will come on for hearing in the Fifth Judicial
District Court on June 6/ 1988 at the hour of 9:30 A.M./ or as
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.
Of the foregoing you will please take notice and govern
yourselves accordingly.
Dated this

/)&

f(
day of May/

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion
for Summary Judgment and Notice of Hearing was mailed/ postage
prepaid/ to:
0* Brenton Rove
Deputy Washington County Attorney
220 North 200 East
St. George/ Utah 84770
David L. Wilkinson
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.

, £U
Dated t h i s

rfb

day of May/

R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS #0904
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Governmental Affairs Div.
D. MICHAEL CARTER #4548
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
State of Utah
Southern Utah State College
Administration Building, 3rd Floor
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-7738 or 628-1732
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,.
vs.
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE
and $3,300 CASH,
Defendant.

]
!
]1
]>
)
]
]
)

MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
REQUEST FOR ORAL
ARGUMENT AND NOTICE
OF HEARING
Civil No. 87-1585

]

Plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through D. Michael Carter,
Assistant Attorney General, hereby moves this Court for an Order
of Partial Summary Judgment on and/or Dismissal of the Counterclaims filed in this action by Claimant Andrew Lewis Taylor.
Plaintiff seeks judgment and/or dismissal upon the Defendant's
prior election of his statutory remedies, the Defendant's failure
to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and/or the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Plaintiff also
and alternatively seeks judgment and/or dismissal by virtue of the

ADDENDUM 6

fact that this is a proceeding in rem which does not contemplate
the filing of a counterclaim, and/or on grounds of failure to join
an indispensable"party.
This Motion is made pursuant to Rules 56 and 12 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and the provisions of U.C.A. Sections 5837-13 (1987), 63-30-10(2) (1985), 63-30-11 through 13 (1987), 6330-19 (1965), 77-35-12(g) (1953, as amended), 78-16-1, et.seq.
(1982), the provisions of 21 USC Section 881 (1981), 19 USC
Sections 1607-9 and State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987).
The foregoing will be more fully set out in the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities which will be filed in support of this
Motion.

This Motion will be further supported by the Affidavits

of F. Steven Lough, Jay Averett, and 0. Brenton Rowe.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED t h i s _^rf%

day o f

frfrzrJtiii*

1989.

yA^, ^ r V v A —
D .\SlCHXEiisCARTER
A s s i s t a n t A ^ o r n e y General

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTERCLAIMANT, AND HIS COUNSEL OF RECORD, MR. J. FRANKLIN
ALLRED:
You will please take notice that the Plaintiff intends to call
on for hearing th<* foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
before the above-entitled Court, the Hon. J. Philip Eves, in his
courtroom at the Washington County Hall of Justice, 220 North 200

2

East, St. George, Utah, on Tuesday, March 14, 1989, at the hour of
9:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard,
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES' ACCORDINGLY
DATED this

V d ? day of *^lfouaA*

, 1989.

D V MICI^AEL\CART'ER
Assistant Attorney General
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
Of the foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, REQUEST FOR
ORAL ARGUMENT, AND NOTICE OF HEARING, first-class postage prepaid
on this

/4&

day of ~^^5Au/tsL4 ^

y^ft,

Mr. J. Franklin Allred, P. C.
Attorney at Law
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

3

1989, to'the following:
Mr. 0. Brenton Rowe
Deputy County Attorney
Hall of Justice
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

IN THE FIFTH D I S T R I C T COURT
WASHINGTON

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 87-1585

Plaintiff,

SCHEDULING ORDER

v.
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE
$3,300.00 CASH

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

Plaintiff(s)

0. Brenton Rowe, Esq.
220 No. 200 East
St. George, UT 84770

Defendant(s)

J. Franklin All red, Esq.
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

TYPE OF CASE:
SETTLEMENT CHANCES:
Poor

X

Excellent_

Good

Fair

Unknown:

PLEADINGS COMPLETED BY:

Now Complete

DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE:

February 1, 1989

MOTION CUT-OFF DATE:

February 15, 1989

DEADLINE FOR AMENDMENTS:
OTHER DEADLINES:
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: CCounsel who w i l l try the case are to be
p r e s e n t . Clients or an individual with authority to s e t t l e the
case are also to be present)
DATE:_^
April 20, 1989
Washington County Hall of Justice
PLACE:
St. George, UT
TIME:

9:30

o'clock

a . m.

A final pre-trial will be held before the Court on
the

20th day of

April

1989

, at

9:30

Thursday
o'clock a. m.

(Counsel who will try the case are to be present).
STIPULATED PROPOSED PRE-TRIAL ORDER, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS,
REOUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND SPECIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS
ARE DUE AT PRE-TRIAL,
Failure to submit Findings, Conclusions, Request for
Jury Instructions and Special Voir Dire Questions within the
time prescribed will result in the Court rejecting the late
filing or non-filing items, and the Court will deem them to
have been waived and will accept the complying party's documents
only,
TRIAL DATE: TUESDAY, MAY 9th, 1989
TIME:

1:30

o'clock

p.

m.

PLACE: Washington Co. Hall of Justice, St. George, UT
TRIAL BRIEFS ARE DUE TWO WEEKS IN ADVANCE OF TRIAL DATE.
TRIAL:

Anticipated Length: h day

; Jury

; Non-JuryJX

.

(Jury fee to be paid five days from date of this Order
or jury shall be waived).
OTHER MATTERS:

The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings
and will not be modified without Court Order and then only upon
a showing of manifest injustice.
DATED this

^3^-

day of

December

, 19 88 .

J. /titLIP EVES/7
DISTRICT COURT/JUDGE
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to counsel
at the addresses indicated above.

Paul F. Graf #1229
Washington County Attorney
0. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Hall of Justice
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE,
$3,300.00 CASH
Defendant.

Civil No. 87-1585

TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, AND THE DEFENDANT, D.
MICHAEL CARTER AND J. FRANKLIN ALLRED:
Pursuant to an Order of Judge J. Philip Eves given on the
14th day of March, 1989, the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Request for Oral Argument and Notice of Hearing will be
held on the 20th day of April, 1989.

Itf-

DATED this / *V

day of March, 1989,

O. BRENTON ROWE
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this /j^T77

day of March,

1989, I mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Notice of Hearing
to D. Michael Carter, Southern Utah State College, Administration

ADDENDUM R

Building, 3rd Floor, Cedar City, Utah 84720; and J. Franklin
Allred, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lak£/-City, Utah 84^03.

ST

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
HON. DEAN E. CONDER, Judge

STATE OF UTAH,

Pi!aintiff,
vs .

)
)

ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE
and $3,000 CASH,

De:fendant.

Civil No. 87-1585

)
)

REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Thursday, April 20, 1989

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:

For the Plaintiff:

D. MICHAEL CARTER, ESQ.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Southern Utah State College
Administration Building, 3rd Floor
Cedar City, Utah 8^720
-and0. BRENTON ROWE, ESQ.
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 8^770

For the Defendant &
Counterclaimant:

Reported By:

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, ESQ.
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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THE COURT:

No. 4, State of Utah versus One 1983

Oldsmobile,
MR. CARTER:

Yes, Your Honor.

Michael Carter

appearing for the State.
MR. ALLRED:

J. Franklin Allred appearing for the

Counterclaimant and owner of the Oldsmobile.
May I say it's good to see Your Honor.

It's

been a number of years.
THE COURT:
interesting.

Okay.

Ifve read this file.

Rather

There's a motion here for summary judgment

on behalf of the State
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

—

That's correct, Your Honor.
—

on the grounds, as I understand it,

one, that there's not a proper Counterclaim filed on
account of the individual is not a defendant named in
here.
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

That's our position.
And therefore could not counterclaim.

It's never been interpled as a party.
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

That's our position, Your Honor.
What about that, Mr. Allred?
Well, Your Honor, I think when they
PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR. RPR

commence an action in res against the vehicle and the
cash, they in essence commence it against the owner.

And

I think that under the rules of procedure, that he can
bring in a Counterclaim along with the others.
The first cause of action in the Counterclaim,
you'll note, is basically a defense to their claim, that
says you unlawfully took the automobile and the cash, and
we want it back.

The second one is a —

is a claim of

violation of statute in handling the automobile.

The

third is a claim for breach of a constructive trust in
handling the automobile and the cash.

And the last is

the Fourth Amendment claim.
But certainly the issues that allow the State
to proceed ought in fairness and under the rules allow
the individual whose property is being taken to make his
claims back in connection with that property.
THE COURT:

Well, isn't that —

as I read those

cases, don't the cases hold that with an in rem action,
you have to file an interpleader then if you want him to
be a party?

And you haven't done that, have you?

MR. ALLRED:

There has not been an interpleader

filed.
THE COURT:
really have?
to it.

Isn't that the situation you should
Because he's not —

he's not a main party

And by bringing an in rem action, it doesn't
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automatically bring him into the lawsuit, does it?
MR. ALLRED:

Well, I think since they served him with

their pleadings to take away or forfeit the vehicle and
the cash, yes, he's in the lawsuit.
defend?

Who else is going to

I mean the cash can't speak, and the car can't

speak.
THE COURT:

Well, he should file an interpleader.

MR. ALLRED:

He answers and says, "I want the money

back."
THE COURT:
MR* ALLRED:

He didn't file an interpleader.
And —• well, under the forfeiture

statutes, you're required to give notice to the owner of
the property.
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

He's the owner of the property.
Yeah.
And I don't think he has to file an

interpleader to get his property back.

Otherwise, the

proceeding is a nullity.
You're saying the State can say, "We're going
to forfeit your car, and you can't come in and say why it
shouldn't be forfeited."
THE COURT:

What about their claim that this has been

forfeited under the federal statute, and therefore, this
is res judicata on this particular matter?
MR. ALLRED:
may —

That's an interesting claim.

If I

may I take a moment, Your Honor, and point out to
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the Court what occurred here?
This vehicle was stopped out here on the
highway, and a search was conducted and contraband was
seized.

Subsequently, as it turns out, the Utah Highway

Patrol agents who seized the contraband, cash, and the
automobile turned the latter to the —
automobile —

the cash and the

over to agents of the federal government.

And we have cited in the pleadings the
appropriate statute and the appropriate handling for
seized items under the state law.

There is nowhere in

the law that says these items can be turned over to
another agency.

They're to be held by the appropriate

officers, subject to two things.
Court —

One, the orders of this

that's Washington County District Court —

and

the orders of the officer seizing it or the person who
has the custody.
jurisdiction.

They have to be held subject to this

They may not be given away.

And I'll get

to the question the Court asks.
Subsequently, Judge Eves determines that that
stop and that seizure of the contraband was unlawful;
ergo, can you have a lawful seizure of the car and the
cash?

That's the real question that is before the Court.

THE COURT:

That's an interesting question, I agree

with you.
MR. ALLRED:

Maybe some of the other-claims —
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Fourth

5
Amendment rightss, etc.

— need interpleaders, but that's

the question raised by their petition to forfeit the
i

j vehicle.
So thek owner of the vehicle comes in.

And if

it!s designated incorrectly, Your Honor, as a
counterclaim ins tead of a response, here' s why you can't

j

prevail on your petition, etc.

j

I believe the owner of

the cash and the vehicle is still there.
that the contraband was unlawfully seized.

He's saying
The illegal

material was taken and found to be illegally taken.

The

lawfully-held vehicle and cash, therefore, have to be
unlawfully taken and must be returned•
Now, as a defense, can the State say —
State walk away —
a moment.

can the

and letf s take the contraband out for

Let's say they stopped a motorist on a highway

down there; took his vehicle and the cash that he had and
then moved to forfeit it.

And when he answered and said,

"You know, I was just driving back to Salt Lake City, and
the police stopped me, and they took my car and my cash,
and I want it back," they said, "We didn't keep your cash
and your car in accordance with the law governing the
seizure of it."
And the law establishes the parameters in which
it may be taken.

It's seized, and it's held by the

officers, subject to the orders of Your Honor and Your
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Honor exclusively.
Then they come back to the Court now to Your
Honor and say, "Well, well, well, we didn't do, Your
Honor, what the statute obligated us to do.
property go.

We let that

Now, as a matter of fact, to receive the

exact property back, it might not be possible because it
has gone where we know not.
violated" —
trust.
is —

We gave it away.

We

one of the claims in here is constructive

"We violated Section 77-38(b)" —

I believe it

"which says seizures are to be undertaken, and we

gave the property to the federal government."

They

published notice, they tell us in their pleadings, in
"U.S.A. Today" and also sent a notice, "and therefore,
we're absolved of any claim for what we've done."
THE COURT:

Let me stop you there for just a second,

Mr. Allred.
Perhaps you're right.
that whole thing.
moment.

Perhaps you're right on

Let's assume that scenario, for the

But the thing that bothers me in reading the

cases they've cited —

I don't know whether you have

anything to the contrary.

But reading the cases to the

contrary, the State is saying, "We want to take the
action of claiming this Oldsmobile and cash and so
forth."

Now, that's what they filed this action to do.

MR. ALLRED:

That's correct.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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THE COURT:

To take possession.

MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:

Thatf s correct.
Now, the Court has alreadyr decided

—

1 Judge Eves has already decided that there was an illegal
search <and seizure*
6j

So that if

— so far as that search

and seizure is concerned, it couldn't be used in any
criminal action against —

this gentleman1s name,

whatever his name is,
MR. CARTER:

Mr. Taylor, Your Honor.

MR. ALLRED:

Mr. Taylor.

THE COURT:
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

What is it?
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor.

So it couldn't be used in

that case.
Now, the question I have for you, though,
Mr. Allred, is Mr. Taylor may well have a legitimate
lawsuit against the State of Utah for wrongfully taking
his property.
case.

But I don't think that rises in this

They're saying this ought to be dismissed in this

case because the State hasn't got any property they can
seek a forfeiture on.
have it.

It —

they gave it up.

They don't

It's not in their possession.
Now, if they've wrongfully taken possession of

it, isn't that a lawsuit that Mr. Taylor has?
is, then Mr. Taylor has to bring the action.
PALL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

And if it
Because

|

he f s not a party to this.

And just the fact that he was

the owner does not make him a party for the purpose of
filing a counterclaim.
MR. ALLRED:

I appreciate what the Court is saying,

but if there isn't some way to resist their petition in
the context of how it occurred —

they said in the

pleadings filed by Mr. Rowe, "We're going to forfeit the
Oldsmobile, and we're going to forfeit the cash."
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

Well

—

I posit this question.

Isn't there some

way for the owner of the Oldsmobile and the cash to
resist that?
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

Sure.
And that's what he has done, at least in

one of these claims.
THE COURT:

No, no.

He hasn't done it.

He files an

interpleader and says, "I'm the guy that owns that."

It

might not have been Mr. Taylor, it might have been
Mr. Joe Jones or somebody who says, "I was the one that
owned that, and I can file an interpleader and claim the
title to that."

That's the purpose of that action.

It seems to me that this action ought to be
dismissed, period.

Because the County has no further

claim on it and didn't have any claim on it, and the
State says it's been —

or the DEA or DA —

whatever it

PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR. RPR
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was.
MR, CARTER:
THE COURT:

That's correct, Your Honor.
And so whatever claim the State of Utah

had in attempting to forfeit that automobile taken under
their alleged claim of illegal use of it, they're out of
the picture.

It ought to be dismissed.

And if you have

an action, you have a separate suit you need to file.
Isn't that the position of it?
MR. CARTER:

That certainly is the position we take.

MR. ALLRED:

Obviously that's the position he wants

to take.

I —

I would urge on Your Honor that when they

commence a forfeiture proceeding, they have to move
forward and show why they can forfeit it.

And he can

—

and we can come in and show at trial why they ought not
be able to forfeit it.
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:

Mr. Allred

—

They're the moving party.
—

how does Mr. Taylor become a party to

this lawsuit when he is not named anyplace in the
plaintiff's action as
MR. ALLRED:
Honor.

He is served in the lawsuit, Your

That's how

THE COURT:

—

—

If you're served as an officer of the

corporation, does that make you liable as an individual?
MR. ALLRED:

Well, no.

But he has notice of the

PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR, RPR
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lawsuit, and they1re saying, "We're going to take this
property from you."
THE COURT:

Fine.

That's exactly my point.

notice that somebody is claiming this car.
if he has a claim on it, he says,

He has

Now he has

f, f

I m coming in.

—

I want

my name put on that lawsuit as an interpleader, and I
want that car."
Isn't that the procedure?

Do you have any case

that says he can do it by simply filing an in rem action,
and he can come in?
MR. ALLRED:

I —

well, there aren't any Utah cases,

certainly, either way on this point.
THE COURT:
can't do it.
recall —

They cited some cases that show that you

That Arizona case, particularly, as I

isn't that the one?

Whichever —

I don't

remember the name.
MR. CARTER:

A case that comes to my mind, Your

Honor, is a federal case.

U.S. versus The —

I think

it's a 380 SEL Mercedes Benz.
THE COURT:

Whichever one it was, I remember it's in

the memorandum you filed that said an individual owner
isn't automatically made a party to it by the filing of
the suit against the in rem action.
MR. ALLRED:
that point.

Well, as I say, there is no Utah case on

The Utah statute says specifically how the
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

forfeiture is to proceed, and they give notice to the
owner.
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

Okay.
And they did so in this case.

And the

owner answered and put the matter at issue and said, "You
can't take the car because you seized it unlawfully.11
And I —

I'm loath to concede that, but I certainly

understand the way the Court is thinking in this, that
the pleading is styled incorrectly.
And if the Court would give us the appropriate
time —

like two days —

we'll file an interpleader.

I

hate to see the whole thing lost, and I feel that
injustice would be done.
THE COURT:

Why would it?

cause of action?

If he has a cause of action, you

haven't lost that.

I'm not going to rule on that.

make it specific here.
action.

Wouldn't your man have his

I'll

I'm not ruling on his cause of

And specifically if he's not a party to this

action by reason of an interpleader, I can't rule on his
position.
MR. ALLRED:

Well, what the Court could do is allow

us to interplead at this juncture, if you're saying the
pleadings are wrong.

In any other civil action, it would

be allowed, I would think.

If you're getting to the

point where you're talking about the trial, etc., and the
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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Court finds that the re's a deficiency in the pleading,

I

then leave won Id be granted -— and again, I1 m kind of
defending the th:Lng —

leave would be granted to clean

the pleadings is all , Your Honor, if that '8 whatf s
If that1 s really the case.

necessary.

THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:
believe —

I think that

~

So at the very minimum, I donft

I would hope to urge on the Court

respectfully urge on the Court —
affirmative action.

—

they brought an

"We're taking your vehicle."

And

they have an obligation of proving the legality of the
seizure as against the owner, who without any pleading at
all, I suggest to the Court, could come in here before
the Court and say, "Here's why they can't take this car.
Here's why they can't proceed."
So if we've designated the counterclaim or any
of the four counterclaims incorrectly, it may be that
some of those should be sheared off.
But I suggest that without any response
whatsoever —

correct nomenclature or not —

the owner of

the property, since he's received notice, can come before
the Court and tell the Court why they may not have an
affirmative relief on their claim to forfeit.

The reason

why is it was unlawfully seized.
THE COURT:

You admit that the State apparently has
PAtJT.
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no further claim on the car or didn't shortly after they
took possession of it?
MR. ALLRED:

Am I correct on that?

I would have to agree with the facts

that say they gave the cash and the vehicle to a third
party, yes.
THE COURT:

And so the State would not be able to

proceed with its claim of forfeiture because it doesn't
have the "rem" to claim the forfeiture on; isn't that
correct?
MR. CARTER:

That is correct, Your Honor.

Well, it

is correct in the context of the suit.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

In the suit.

MR. CARTER:

Yes.

MR. ALLRED:

They need the forfeiture to ratify what

they improperly did.
And what happened is that they brought the
action, I guess, not knowing that the forfeiture had gone
on, or to forfeit it legally to correct what they, the
State, improperly did.

That was give it away.

And we're saying, "You cannot forfeit it
legally, for the reason that you didn't seize it
legally."

And that's where the second cause of action

comes in as constructive trust.
And I think if —

if you dismiss their claim

and I don't think they've moved to dismiss their own
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claim.

The claim was there, and I believe that the owner

can come in with or without a counterclaim —

if I've

improperly filed the counterclaims, the owner can come in
and say, "Here's why they can't have the affirmative
relief" and pose that legal issue without ever
responding.
But at a minimum, if the Court says the Arizona
case applies under the Utah statute and that interpleader
ought to be there, then I think you should give the
Oldsmobile and the cash five days to file an
interpleader —

or the true owner five days to file an

interpleader if the case
THE COURT:
MR. CARTER:

—

What about that, Counsel?
Well, Your Honor, the position we take

relative to the interpleader is that at the time that the
forfeiture action at issue here was filed, Mr. Taylor's
complete and entire interests had been terminated four
months earlier by federal action.

We don't believe he

has a claim or an interest in this property in order to
file a counterclaim interpleader or any related claim of
interest in the present suit because his interests had
been earlier terminated and cut off by federal action.
THE COURT:

Well, it seems to me we're waltzing

around the mulberry bush and coming to the same place.
Because if you file an interpleader, you're getting right
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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back to filing the same as if you'd filed a lawsuit.
MR. CARTER:
step.

Well, I want to take the Court back one

There is a motion in the file whereby the State

has asked —

has asked that his action be dismissed.

believe that that was heard.

I

I'm unaware of any order

ever proceeding from that hearing, and we would take the
position that the matter is open for complete dismissal,
and we would urge that upon the Court this morning.
THE COURT:

Is that the one that Judge Burns ruled

on?
MR. CARTER:

No.

Thatf s one that Judge Eves, I

believe, ruled on.
MR. ALLRED:
Honor.

I don't believe it was ruled an, Your

But certainly they can't, after responsive

pleadings —

whether they're improperly titled or not,

they can't simply move to dismiss.
My recollection would be that Mr. Rowe and
Judge Eves —

and I spoke about that —

that the Court

was impressed with the fact that someone from the
Attorney General's office was not involved in this
lawsuit.
I sent them a notice of claim back in 1987,
registered mail.

I have served all the pleadings in the

case on the Attorney General's office, as well as
Mr. Rowe.

We never got any answer from them.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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after a certificate of readiness for trial was filed in
this case, counsel shows up.

And I have spoken with the

Court and didn't mean to waive the —

our motion to

strike the overly long memo, etc., but thatfs a
technicality that the Court can deal with.
What's at issue here is whether or not this
claim is going to be irrevocably lost because of what
counsel says here is a defense, I suppose, to a claim now
by Mr. Taylor.

If we file a lawsuit, they say, "Listen,

you don't have a claim against us.

Your rights were

forfeited in the federal action."
Well, all of that is now before this Court.

If

itfs improperly pled, all I'm saying is that a few days
to clean those pleadings still leaves us with these
issues.

One, can they seize property legally if the stop

was unlawful?

And, two, can they absolve themselves of

liability by turning it over to the federal government?
And I think this Court could rule on that as a matter of
law and then take such other further necessary steps
as —

in establishing factual issues of damage if its

rule is affirmatively.

And we can clean the pleadings so

the Court can do that.
THE COURT:

I understand your position, and I'm

certainly not ruling —

let's make it very, very clear

on whether or not that your claim is valid or invalid.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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You understand what I'm saying, that that's not before
me.

Your motion is for summary judgment, as I recall.
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

That's correct, Your Honor.
But I don't think I can rule on summary

judgment -— well, if I rule on summary judgment, that may
in effect be res judicata on Mr. Allred's claim —

if I

were to rule that he had to file a separate claim and
dismiss his counterclaim in this case —
client.

against his

I don't want to jeopardize his client.

each party ought to have a —

I think

a fair shake of the dice

here.
MR. CARTER:

Your Honor, with respect to that, again,

I reiterate the fact that there were federal proceedings
held in this matter.

The notices that were given in that

context were appropriate under federal law.
response.

There was no

That would have been, in my opinion, the

proper opportunity for Mr. Taylor to assert his interest
in the automobile and to prevent the forfeiture from
already having taken place.
THE COURT:

But if that's true —

true, for the moment —

and assume it's

if that's true, does that say

that the State has made a legitimate action in taking
possession of this car under a forfeiture Statute?

If

they're in error on that, how does it absolve the State
from liability if the federal government has already made
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a forfeiture?
MR. CARTER:

I don't mean to suggest that it absolves

the State, Your Honor.

Irm suggesting that the defense

of improper taking would have been more properly asserted
when the forfeiture proceeding was extant within the
federal guidelines.

By failing to appear in that federal

action; by failing to assert that defense or any other
available defense in that earlier proceeding, it —

it's

our position that Mr. Taylor has thereby waived those
defenses of improper taking or so forth, or that he's
failed to timely file them.

And those interests that he

may then have asserted have been terminated through the
federal action.
We don't believe that his interest is any
longer.

We believe that it was terminated by federal

action, and that —

that the case before this Court was

untimely and superfluous and shouldn't have been filed at
all.

It was a matter of miscommunication and mistake.
THE COURT:

Well, that doesn't —

that doesn't

justify summary judgment.
MR. CARTER:

Well, the point we're asking, Your

Honor, is that the counterclaims be dismissed because
Mr. Taylor has no interest upon which to base them.
He's, as you point out, not a party to this action, and
that once the —

we see that in terms of a sequence.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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the counterclaims are dismissed, then we stand in the
context of a Complaint and Answer.

We would then ask the

Court to dismiss the Complaints as having been improperly
filed.

We have no interest —- we have no need to forfeit

the car, and there's no point in going forward with the
thing because it's already been done and stands ais res
judicata four months earlier.
THE COURT:

Mr. Rowe, you filed this action.

Do you

want it dismissed?
MR. ROWE:

Yes, Your Honor.

That's ~

basically I

was unaware of any federal forfeiture proceedings.
that's the miscommunication.

And

Had I been aware, 1 never

would have filed the lawsuit.

In fact, I wasn't aware

that the federal authorities were even going to be
involved when the controlled substances were located.
I found out after I'd filed charges in the
criminal action that was ultimately suppressed, that
about 10 days later —

—

that all my physical evidence had

gone to the federal authorities, and my expert who
analyzed the substance was in San Francisco.

And from

then on, it was just a matter of not knowing what they'd
done with the car or the money.

And it wasn't until

after I filed the forfeiture action, that I learned that
the federal authorities had also taken the car and the
money.

And that's why I filed it because I felt that the
tAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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State still had it in their possession because it was
state agents that initially came to me as a result of the
roadblock and the seizure of the vehicle requesting for
charges to be filed.
Had I known that the substance had gone to the
federal authorities, I!d have asked them to have
prosecuted any criminal action and —
piecemeal here.

rather than do it

And when I learned that the federal

authorities had forfeited it, I had no longer any
interest in the property.
So at least as to the State's claim on the
money and the vehicle, I would move to dismiss that,
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

Mr. Allred, how would Mr.

—

Judge?
Excuse me.

Did somebody have something?

I was just going to say I have a

response.
The problem arises here, Your Honor —

if we're

allowed to as I say clean up our pleading to the action,
58-37-13 does not give the agents who seize a vehicle or
money or anything any authority to turn those over to the
federal government.
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:

Fine.
So the violation of law is

—

That may be.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

MR. ALLRED:

Is what —

that's created the problem on

the State.
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:
point.

But I'm not ruling on that.
I understand that.

We're not to that

But if we get the pleading properly before the

Court, we end up, no matter where we go, in the same
posture.
taken?

A, was the vehicle and the cash illegally
B, if so, does the fact that the federal

government forfeit them preclude this lawsuit?

And

that's what we're trying to get to.
And I'm saying if the Court would give us some
time to clean up the pleadings satisfactorily, we do get
those two issues resolved.
THE COURT:

It seems to me the cleaner way of doing

it —• if there's such a term as that —
do that is Mr. Taylor files a suit.

the best way to

He may want to sue

the federal government as well as the State and say these
are the things that they did wrong, and that would remove
this question of the State's claim on it right now, which
apparently the State doesn't have and didn't have.
Wouldn't you be in a better position to do
that?
MR. ALLRED:

No.

I don't think so.

Your Honor, the

time has passed and other defenses arise.
THE COURT:

Why would you be prejudiced?
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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MR. ALLRED:

We're certainly prejudiced any time

we've almost got this thing to trial.
on May 10.

We're almost there.

before the Court.

It's set for trial

We have the issues

So it's now like a board game.

Well,

now you're going to go back to square one and file an
action in the federal court and file an action in the
state court and serve notice and wait for the time to run
against the Attorney General again.
THE COURT:

If you file an interpleader, you're not

going to have a trial on May 9, are you?
MR. ALLRED:

Well, no.

And I don't think we're going

to have any trial in any event, Your Honor, except to
perhaps damages.

That is, the value of the automobile

during the time it was wrongfully deprived —

it's use

was wrongfully deprived the owner and the value —
market value of the cash that was taken.

the

If we prevail.

THE COURT:

Gee, that shouldn't be hard to establish.

MR. ALLRED:

It shouldn't be hard to establish if we

prevail.

So we need a "yes" on the Answer.

And if the

vehicle was illegally taken and the cash, we need a "yes"
there.

And when they gave the property to the federal

government, did that absolve the State of
responsibility?

We need a "yes" or a "no."

If that's

determined against us either way, as a matter of law,
there's no fact.

As a matter of law, then, our case is
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concluded.

So

THE COURT:

~
You mean you're going to —

those are the

only two issues you're going to rely on?
i

MR. ALLRED:

I believe those are the issues that are

raised.
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

You raised others in your counterclaim.
Well, if the —

if the —

those issues

are answered against us in either place, the counterclaim
dies.

Because the constructive trust isn't there; the

Fourth Amendment violation isn!t there.

Those two

answers are the bases for which all the counterclaims
derive.

If there was a —

if you can lawfully seize a

vehicle, even though you've unlawfully seized the
contraband —

and that takes a leap of faith, I think

if they say, "Well, the seizure" —

—

or "the forfeiture

was lawful nevertheless," all the claims die.

Or if they

say, "Well, since the State, instead of keeping its trust
as required by 58-37-13, gave the property to some third
party and didn't hold it subject to the order of this
Court, nevertheless that's all right," all our claims die
again.

They're all dependent on the answers to those two

questions.

And I think that this Court could rule on

that if it would allow us to file an interpleader.
I can't get back today to do it, but I can have
an interpleader in next week.

And then the trial date
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can be either vacated while we have a subsequent hearing
on these issues or set it another time.
THE COURT:
MR. CARTER:

Counsel?
Your Honor, I'm frankly more inclined to

agree with the Court's view on this.

Because I don't

think an interpleader of its own right is the —

the

complete cure for what counsel urges.
I would point out to the Court the need for

—

the DEA is an indispensable party in this action.
Clearly they've undertaken to deal in terms of whether or
not Mr. Allred has an interest in this property.

And I

don't think that this is merely an issue between the
State and Mr. Allred.
me.

Mr. Taylor.

I think Mr. Allred —

I beg your pardon.

or excuse

Clearly Mr. Taylor

was dealt with by both the State and federal agencies,
okay?

I think —• I think the urgence that only the State

was involved in the seizure is a bit misconstrued there
because the DEA was involved in this case from day one.
They were not involved in the original seizure, however.
There's evident suspicion, at least, that
Mr. Taylor was involved in violation of not only state,
but federal law.

The cooperative elements between state

and federal governments there came into play, and all of
this argument about constructive trust and the taking
entity and so forth I think is very fairly viewed by
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virtue of the fact that there was -- there was co-equal
jurisdiction; there was a joint act between state and
federal authorities.

Decisions were made among those

people that were immediate, and the federal government
took possession of this vehicle and the money on the day
of its seizure by the highway patrol.

I should think

that that's not uncommon, and I donft think in that
statute, there1s any prohibition against any cooperative
element.
In fact, if only by analogy —

because it

doesn't speak to disposition of the property —

but 58

—

58-13-12, the statute just preceding the forfeiture
statute, shows strong indication that there should be
interagency cooperation on these matters to the total
end; that the drug problem is thereby negated.
not speak to the property.

It does

It speaks generally in terms

of cooperation between records and so forth.

But I think

it clearly suggests the opportunity for interagency
cooperation on matters, and there1s no question but what
there could have just as easily been a violation of
federal law in this case as there might have been
collateral issues of violations of state law.
I donft think the seizure by the Utah Highway
Patrol is the necessary immediate focus.
agents were just as involved.

The federal

In fact more involved as
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you consider the time frame of the thing and the actual
forfeiture that was undertaken.
THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Allred?

MR. ALLRED:

If I may speak briefly to that.

It may

be that as the defendant, they have a third-party claim
against the drug enforcement agency and would want to
assert that.

That's another matter of pleading.

But

it's not necessary for us asserting the counterclaims to
bring that party in.
That defense is still available to them.

If

the Court rules they gave it away and that suffices, then
they're out on that theory.
liability.

The State is absolved from

If the Court says, "Well, Mr. Allred, you

failed to serve the drug enforcement agency, and
therefore, you lose in this claim," we'll accept that.
But may I read to the Court under 58-37-13 (4),
where it says:

"Property taken or detained under this

section is not repleviable but shall be deemed to be in
the custody of the law enforcement agency making the
seizure subject only to the orders and decrees of the
Court or the official having jurisdiction.

Whenever

property is seized under the provisions of this act, the
appropriate person or agency may place the property under
seal, remove the property to a place designated by it or
the warrant under which it was seized, and/or take
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate
location for disposition in accordance with law."
And this is the law that could govern the
disposition of that property.

And it does not say

anything about interagency cooperation, or that they may
release that property to a third party, whether itfs a
federal agency or a —

another state agency.

seized by the law enforcement authorities —

It was
now, the way

I read their facts and the way I recall it, Your Honor,
the Utah Highway Patrol took all the property.

They

brought it here to St. George, stored it under seal, I
suppose, of the property authority, and somehow it
appears the federal government came down —
don't misuse the term —
property.

and I hope I

muscled in and took the

But their responsibility —

the highway

patrol1s responsibility was to hold it until Your Honor
or a person of your same competent authority said,
"Here's what you do with the property."
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

Anything else?
That's what we hope to raise.

And if

the Court will give us the time to re-plead it, I think
in fairness to the owner of the vehicle and in fairness
to all parties, if we put it in a proper pleading
prospective and then have those two issues ruled on by
the Court as a matter of law, that would be the easiest
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most effective and fairest way to resolve the case.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. CARTER:

Yes, Your Honor.

I would suggest to the

Court that counsel's reading of the statute there is much
too constrained to have the property dealt with and
disposed according to —

in accordance with law.

He

would suggest that that cannot accrue under federal law.
Also the suggestion would be that once the highway patrol
is the agency, that they're the only agency that can deal
with this.

I think that's far too constrained.

Because

as the Court may have noted from the pleadings,
immediately after the highway patrol became involved and
in recognizing that there may be a narcotics violation,
they called in a separate state agency, the Bureau of
Alcohol and Narcotics —

whatever it is specifically

—

but they called in that agency.
THE COURT:
who's —

But that all gets down to a question of

who's doing the right thing here and that sort

of thing.

That isn't an issue before me right now.

MR. CARTER:

Well, I suppose that's the case.

I

—

But to

the extent that the argument is being made, I feel
somewhat compelled to try to make any clarification that
might be helpful.
It's our position that there was an interagency
cooperative element operating here, and that due to
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circumstances and decisions within those agency
relationships, the federal government took control of
this property, and they have dealt with it.
terminated Mr. Taylorfs interests.

They have

He has no interest to

assert at this time in this proceeding, having failed to
do that in federal court.
We feel that this proceeding is simply filed as
a result of a mistaken communication, and as the Court
suggested earlier, the whole thing should be dismissed
this morning.

And if Mr. Taylor feels that he has a

collateral lawsuit against the state or federal agencies,
by all means he should consult counsel and pursxie that if
he deems it appropriate.

But we donft think he1(s either

a party or an interest holder in this case, and we simply
wish to do away with the matter and let the chips
subsequently fall where they may.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

case should be dismissed.
and —

It's my opinion that this
I'm going to dismiss the case

without prejudice in any fashion whatsoever as to

Mr. Taylor's claim that Mr. Taylor may want to file
may or may not want to file in a separate action.

—
But I

think that he's not a party before this action under the
circumstances.

I!11 dismiss the petition and the

counterclaim.
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MR, CARTER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

With the Court's

instruction, would you direct that a pleading be created
to that effect?
THE COURT:
MRc CARTER:
THE COURT:

May I offer to do that?
File an order of dismissal, yes

—

Yes.
—

in accordance with my ruling here.

MR. CARTER:

Thank you.

MR. ALLRED:

That should specifically say "without

prejudice."
THE COURT:
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:
MR. CARTER:

Without prejudice.
By all means.
Any claim of Mr. Taylor's.
By all means.

Thank you.

(Whereupon the proceedings in the
above-entitled matter were concluded.)
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 12

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days
after the service of the summons is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading stating a
cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days after the
service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the
answer within 20 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by
the court, within 20 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as
follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days
after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1) — (7)
in Subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and
the motion for judgment mentioned in Subdivision (c) of this rule shall be
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
35
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reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after
notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court
may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order
as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him, the
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in Subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — Except for minor variations, this rule follows Rule 12, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Motions generally,
Rule 7.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 38,
43 to 45; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237,
280, 389 et seq.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136,
138, 143, 144, 162 et seq., 173; 27 CJ.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 CJ.S. Pleading
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to
268, 424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to
586.
A.L.R. — Right to voluntary dismissal of
civil action as affected by opponent's motion for
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Necessity of hearing and oral argument in

federal courts on motion for summary judgment or for judgment on the pleadings, 1
A.L.R. Fed. 295.
What, other than affidavits, constitutes
"matters outside the pleadings," which may
convert motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b), (c) into motion for summary
judgment, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 1027.
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or
13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as
waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
Key Numbers. — Dismissal and Nonsuit «=»
67; Pleading «=» 76 et seq., 85, 89 to 95, 218 to
226, 342 to 350, 361 to 364, 367, 404 to 413.

Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its abjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule
13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the
pleading of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
§ 188 et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 CJ.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84.
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution

or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A.L.R.4th 338.
Key Numbers. — Parties <t=» 49 to 56.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 15, F.R.C.P.
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